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Abstract 
 
Since 1958, China has constructed over 140 sports facilities around the world. Previous 
research into stadium diplomacy lacks definitional clarity, has not systematically investigated 
the phenomenon, and crucially, has failed to explain why China employs stadium diplomacy 
where it does. This article defines the phenomenon and locates all known cases without 
temporal or geographic restrictions. We create a classification system and typology, 
permitting a comparison of theoretically-like types to develop and test a multi-determinant 
theory. We find empirical evidence that China employs stadium diplomacy to secure natural 
resources and to secure diplomatic recognition in line with the One-China policy. These 
findings have important implications for scholarship into the use of soft power within 
interstate rivalry, and the methodology demonstrates that a clear typology of soft power which 
is mutually exclusive and logically exhaustive can be created and is informative. 
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Introduction1 
Several dozen photographers and reporters hurried into position while onlookers jostled for 
view, dodging the earthmovers and dust of the construction site. The President’s limousine 
was pulling up, but no one had come to see him. Lionel Messi was here! The best player of 
the world’s most popular game was in Port-Gentil, Gabon, a world away from his home in 
Barcelona, to lay the cornerstone of China’s newest stadium (Djellit, 2015). Just the latest 
example of China’s stadium diplomacy, a soft-power push dating back to 1958, reaching from 
Antigua, to Vanuatu, to Dar es Salaam. 
Stadium diplomacy is a form of check book diplomacy invented by and almost entirely 
unique to China, whereby the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) funds the construction of 
sports facilities as one option among many on a menu from which recipient states select their 
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preferred infrastructure projects. Other projects on offer include roads, bridges, and even 
government buildings (Brautigam, 2009). This phenomenon has never been systematically 
investigated nor convincingly explained with sufficient scholarly rigour, leaving unanswered 
why China employs stadium diplomacy where it does, and which determinants guide its use. 
This analysis, for the first time, operationally defines stadium diplomacy in order to determine 
whether soft power is or is not in play; locates 142 cases in 61 countries to identify and 
measure soft power. It classifies all observed cases within a typology with clearly defined 
domains and criteria for failure. And it identifies patterns between typological groups to 
develop and test an issue-based, multi-determinant theoretical explanation that China employs 
stadium diplomacy to secure friends and resources. Additionally, by delineating mutually 
exclusive typological groups capable of guiding future case selection, this methodological 
approach offers international relations scholars a generalizable framework to operationalize 
and investigate other forms and uses of soft power. 
This empirical investigation into the determinants of China’s stadium diplomacy is 
particularly timely. China’s rise and its disruptive potential is often considered in terms of 
China’s material capacity. Yet, China’s soft power, the ability to get other countries to want 
what it wants through attraction as opposed to coercion (Nye, 1990), is perceived as 
ineffective: coming last in a ranking of thirty states, behind minor-powers such as New 
Zealand and the Czech Republic (McClory, 2015: 25). As a rising superpower, China actively 
seeks to increase its soft power (Li, 2009: 1), and anecdotal evidence suggests stadium 
diplomacy may be an effective, scalable form of soft power for China. 
 
Theoretical Foundations 
Scholars’ understanding of power’s sources, its scope, and its use has progressed beyond 
Dahl’s (1957: 201) A making B do what B would otherwise not. One of the most significant 
theoretical advances has been the identification of an alternative, an attractive, form of power 
(Nye, 1990). To wield soft power is to “achieve desired outcomes because others want what 
you want,” (Nye, 1999) with a state’s culture, ideology, and values attracting others to follow 
it; to borrow its techniques and experiences; to emulate its example; to admire its values and 
traditions; to seek to achieve its level of development and prosperity (Nye, 2002: 8-11; 
Vuving, 2009: 8-12). States seeking major-power or great-power status must be able to use 
both hard and soft power in the international system, much as a three-dimensional chess 
player’s success depends on her ability to simultaneously play both horizontally and vertically 
(Nye, 2004: 72).  
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Within traditional soft power scholarship, however, there exists both a conceptual and a 
logical hurdle which together hold back theoretical progression. In conceiving soft power, 
Nye makes a clear distinction between soft power and economic power, which he considers 
coercive (Nye, 2002: 8-11); though whether this distinction between economic and soft power 
even exists, and if it does where that dividing line is, remains unspecified (Li, 2009). Indeed, 
the US does not wield hegemonic power through “guns and Hollywood alone” (Mead, 2009). 
Rather it uses economic power in ways other states find attractive, not coercive (e.g. 
humanitarian disaster assistance). Secondly, it is logically unclear why culture, ideology, and 
values must be the source(s) of attractive power, as Nye (1990: 11) insists. Indeed, certain 
cultures, ideologies, and values may be repulsive, depending upon the audience.  
The deficiencies of traditional soft power research suggest a deeper definitional 
problem. If soft power really is “like love, easy to feel but hard to define,” (Nye, 1990: 11) 
that is problematic. Without defining the phenomenon under investigation, how can scholars 
1) know whether soft power is in play, 2) measure soft power, and 3) recognize if soft power 
translates into policy outcomes (Li, 2009: 4)? Without these basic data, generalizable 
scholarship is impossible. Li (2009: 7) succinctly sums up the problem and the path forward. 
Instead of classifying power by its source, scholars ought to instead classify it by how it is 
wielded: whether power is used to attract or to coerce (Li, 2009: 7). This simple but radical 
rethink of ‘power-used-softly’ makes conceptual sense and offers the greatest analytical 
clarity and power, because it permits a broader range of interstate behaviour to be placed and 
studied within the framework of soft power.  
Soft power translated into practice on-the-ground may be the best way to conceive of 
public diplomacy, where states promote positive and attractive images to those outside its 
borders by building relations and influencing foreign publics’ perceptions (Melissen, 2013: 
1). Culture, especially, offers an effective medium for presenting an appealing image and 
attracting others’ admiration (Nye, 2002: 8-11), because “it is [through] cultural activities that 
a nation’s idea of itself is best represented” to the world (US Department of State, 2005: 1). 
Government sponsored institutions such as the Cervantes [Spain], Goethe [Germany], or 
Confucius [China] Institutes of Language & Culture are perhaps the most well-known 
examples, but movies & television (Otmazgin, 2008; Thussu, 2013), food (Reynolds, 2012), 
clothing (Macleod, 2013; Ramzy, 2014), and art can also be powerful tools of value 
transmission and cultural attraction. When Tutankhamun’s mask toured America in 1976, 
visitors waited in line for hours, even bringing sleeping bags, to catch sight of it (Burghart, 
2006). The tour sparked ‘tut-mania’ in America, and everything from Egyptian hair and 
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makeup styles to ‘tut-inspired’ dances became part of the zeitgeist (Kamp, 2013). The 
attractive power of Egyptian culture is evident still, and it gives the regime political leeway. 
Internationally, Egypt is known as the land of the Nile, King Tut, and the Pyramids, not 
Tahrir Square or the violence following the Revolution.  
The political value of cultural attraction is not lost on China’s leaders. Its public 
diplomacy has become increasingly sophisticated over the last twenty years (Zhu, 2013: 
6,16,29). China has created its own version of the American Peace Corps and brought 
thousands of students a year to China on university scholarships (Brautigam, 2009: 123-124). 
But China’s most famous ambassadors, cultural or otherwise, are its pandas loaned to zoos 
around the world as ‘panda diplomacy’ (Hartig, 2013). China has proven to be pragmatic with 
its use of public diplomacy, and its willingness to experiment has led to novel methods of 
wielding soft power, including the use of sport and its facilities as public diplomacy. 
The effectiveness of sports diplomacy as public diplomacy stems from sport’s salience 
to participants and its capacity to shape public opinion (Jennings, 2011: 7). Billions 
participate,2 and it bypasses verbal or written communication, making it suitable for 
friendship-building (Maguire, 2005: 1). However, international relations scholarship into 
sports diplomacy has been limited to a set of theoretically similar dyads3 (Murray, 2013: 12), 
where sport plays a de-escalatory role within enduring rivalries (Diehl & Goertz, 2000: 143), 
especially those born feuding in which bellicose rivalrous behaviour is particularly intense 
(Wayman, 2000). Repeatedly selecting theoretically similar cases for investigation results in a 
narrow understanding of sports diplomacy. The lens of power-used-softly permits scholars to 
broaden the study of sports diplomacy by identifying sports facilities, beyond sport itself, as 
attractive forces. This creates a new theoretical intersection between sports and soft power: 
stadium diplomacy whose effectiveness, just as any other form of public diplomacy, depends 
upon engaging and attracting a broad audience (Melissen, 2013). These modern stadiums are 
highly visible, tangible symbols of China to even the most marginal members of society in a 
way that traditional (western) and more anonymous forms of assistance are not (Pazzanita, 
1996: 47).  
Existing theoretical explanations of China’s stadium diplomacy differ on which issues-
at-stake shape China’s policy preferences. The dominant research programme posits that 
 
2 Football alone claims more adherents than the Catholic Church (Kunz, 2007). 
3 Wrestling [Iran-USA](Chehabi, 2001; Marks, 1999); Ping pong [USA-China](Griffin, 2014); Football [Turkey-
Armenia](Gunter & Rochtus, 2010); Cricket [India-Pakistan](Næss-holm, 2007); Baseball [USA-Cuba](National 
Security Archive at the George Washington University); Chess [USA-USSR](Edelman, 2006); 1980-84 Olympic 
Boycotts [USA-USSR](Goldberg, 2000). 
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China’s engagement with the global south, and Africa in particular, is driven by pursuit of the 
mineral and energy resources required to maintain domestic economic growth and by 
extension, regime stability (The Economist, 2008a; The Economist, 2008c; Alm, 2012; 
Barranguet, 2010; Blenford, 2007; Ferdinand, 2012; Guest, 2009; Hawksley, 2010; Ross, 
2014; Will, 2012). This resource-seeking foreign policy is informed by and contributes to 
Mearsheimer’s (2006) China-threat theory scholarship, whose advocates explain Chinese 
engagement by observing that the global south is home to two thirds of the world’s natural 
resources (Winter, 2010). The alternative research programme contends the issue-at-stake for 
China is diplomatic recognition in line with the One-China policy. The few states which 
diplomatically recognize Taiwan are disproportionately located in the comparatively resource-
poor Caribbean and Oceania, and anecdotal evidence points towards a concentrated use of 
stadium diplomacy in these regions. For these scholars (Erikson & Chen, 2007; McElroy & 
Bai, 2008), the PRC’s enduring rivalry with the ROC on Taiwan is key to understanding its 
soft-power push, and the otherwise unusual behaviour of stadium construction in minor-
power states is a tool to diplomatically isolate a rival (Kurlantzick, 2007; Sheringham, 2007; 
Zhu, 2013). 
These competing research programs identify separate issues-at-stake for China and 
delineate foreign policy goals which it pursues using stadium diplomacy. However, the 
existing scholarship has two primary short comings. It fails to develop explicit operational 
definitions of the phenomenon under investigation, and its hypotheses are developed 
deductively from limited geographic or temporal domains. This fragmented approach results 
in case-specific explanations which offer no generalizable insight into either China’s use of 
soft power or the policy goals which guide it.  
 
Inventory of Stadium Diplomacy and Initial Observations 
This inventory represents the first attempt to identify all cases of stadium diplomacy 
regardless of where or when they were constructed, a necessary step for generalizable, 
empirical study. In order to distinguish between cases which are and are not available for 
investigation, China’s stadium diplomacy is operationally defined as: 
The construction or renovation of sporting facilities, funded by China, outside its borders. 
If China consciously employs this soft power tool in pursuit of particular policy goals as Will 
(2012: 38) predicts, there should be identifiable patterns between recipient states. We use 
these characteristic patterns to develop a new, multi-determinant, explanatory theory of 
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stadium diplomacy. We employ an ex ante theoretical classification scheme to create a 
mutually exclusive and logically exhaustive scientific typology with clearly defined 
explanatory domains (Baily, 1994: 3), allowing us to differentiate between types (George & 
Bennett, 2005: 234). The classification scheme delineates and operationalizes the typological 
criteria (Vasquez & Valeriano, 2010: 293), permitting the typology to be tested against data 
and potentially falsified – crucial to any theory-building exercise (Popper, 1959: Chapter 1, 
section 6). Any new theory of stadium diplomacy, in order to be considered progressive, must 
be capable of providing domain-specific explanations of the phenomenon and guiding future 
empirical research (Lakatos, 1970:182-191). The methodology employed in this analysis 
delivers on both counts. It offers novel insight and can serve as a template for future empirical 
enquiry into other forms of soft power. Table 1 reports all observed cases of stadium 
diplomacy grouped by the recipient state.  
 
Table 1. Inventory by State 
Recipient State n   Recipient State cont. n 
Senegal 12  Somalia 2 
Ghana 6  Uganda 2 
Laos 6  Vanuatu 2 
Mali 6  Zimbabwe 2 
Cameroon 5  Antigua & Barbuda 1 
Fiji 5  Bahamas 1 
Tanzania 5  Benin 1 
Angola 4  Burkina Faso 1 
Cambodia 4  Cape Verde 1 
Samoa 4  Central African Republic 1 
Sierra Leone 4  Chad 1 
Zambia 4  Cook Islands 1 
Congo 3  Costa Rica 1 
Equatorial Guinea 3  Cote d'Ivoire 1 
Gabon 3  Dominica 1 
Mongolia 3  Democratic Rep. Congo 1 
Papua New Guinea 3  Micronesia 1 
Algeria 2  Gambia 1 
Barbados 2  Guinea 1 
Djibouti 2  Kiribati 1 
Grenada 2  Malawi 1 
Guinea Bissau 2  Mauritania 1 
Jamaica 2  Mauritius 1 
Kenya 2  Mozambique 1 
Liberia 2  Rwanda 1 
Morocco 2  Sri Lanka 1 
Myanmar 2  St. Lucia 1 
Nepal 2  Suriname 1 
Niger 2  Syria 1 
Pakistan 2  Togo 1 
Seychelles 2    
Source: Authors own work 
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Table 1 identifies 142 cases of stadium diplomacy in 61 countries on every continent 
but Europe. The average distribution is 2.32 stadiums per recipient state, but 43 of 61 
recipients have two or fewer, resulting in a modal distribution of one stadium per recipient 
state. The count data exceed the estimates of all previous authors (Alm, 2012; Barranguet, 
2010) and even the most recent self-reported data by more than half (SCIO, 2011). The total 
number of stadiums and recipient states is not the only intriguing observation. There is also a 
marked acceleration in the use of stadium diplomacy which is immediately apparent in 
Graphs 1 and 2. Between 1958 and 1989, there are 25 identified cases (0.8 per year). From 
1990-2009, there are 62 observations (3.3 per year); and from 2010 through summer 2016 
there are 57 examples (8.8 per year). This acceleration of soft-power usage mirrors China’s 
overall foreign aid expenditures (Brautigam, 2009: Chapter 6) and is in line with what one 
would expect to see from an economy that saw near double digit year-on-year growth for over 
a decade. It also suggests that China finds increasing utility in this particular form of soft 
power 
 
Graph 1. Cumulative Stadium Diplomacy by Region (n=142)  
 
Source: Authors own graph 
 
 
 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Africa
Asia
Pacific
Caribbean
Hugh Vondracek  JCIR: Vol. 7, No. 1 (2019) 
69 
 
Graph 2. Cumulative Stadium Diplomacy by Region 2000 – 2016 (n=108)   
Source: Author’s own graph 
 
The acceleration of stadium diplomacy takes on added theoretical significance when 
considered with its regional distribution. The recipients of Chinese-built stadiums are 
disproportionately located in Africa, the Caribbean, and Oceania with 114 of 142 of all cases, 
and 87 of 108 since 2000, found in these three regions. These data suggest that both the 
‘stadiums-for-resources’ and ‘stadiums-for-friends’ explanations may be in play, though they 
may operate in separate regions. Additionally, this pattern of regional clustering suggests 
these regions are not only salient to China but increasingly so. 
 
A New Multi-Determinant Theory of China’s Stadium Diplomacy 
The inventory of all observed cases of stadium diplomacy suggests the phenomenon has 
multiple determinants with distinct domains. Existing research programmes have arrived at 
two superficially credible, partial-explanations of stadium diplomacy which are capable of 
identifying issues-at-stake for China and linking those issues to the geographic regions with a 
high number of cases. Considered in tandem, the ‘stadiums-for-resources’ and ‘stadiums-for-
friends’ theories appear to hold explanatory power over a significant number of cases. 
Reconciling the two may result in a more robust theory capable of explaining an even greater 
number of cases. Presented here is a new theory of stadium diplomacy capable of accounting 
for the simultaneous existence of multiple determinants with distinct explanatory domains: 
China employs stadium diplomacy to secure diplomatic recognition in line with the One-
China policy and to secure natural resources. 
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The Classification Scheme and Typology 
The classification scheme presented here categorizes the recipient states of stadium diplomacy 
by their shared characteristics along two theoretical dimensions identified by previous 
research into salient issues-at-stake for China: durability of diplomatic recognition; and 
resource richness. The ordering principle reflects China’s policy of diplomatic recognition as 
a precondition for economic relations (McElroy & Bai, 2008: 239). The resulting typology 
leads to the creation of ten genotypes as laid out in Figure 1. Type 1, for example denotes a 
stadium where the recipient state is an enduring friend that is resource rich. Type 9 on the 
opposite end of the spectrum represents a stadium constructed for a new friend that is not 
resource rich. 
 
Figure 1. Classification System of Stadium Diplomacy by Genotype 
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 (Type 1) (Type 2) (Type 3)  (Type 4) (Type 5) (Type 6)  (Type 7) (Type 8) (Type 9)  (Type 10) 
Source: Authors own work 
 
Within the typology, Types 1-9 lie within the domain of our proposed theory that China 
engages in stadium diplomacy to secure friends and resources. Cases classified as Type 10 lie 
beyond the explanatory domain of the theory and represents a failure of Chinese soft power to 
secure its predicted policy preferences. For future theory appraisal, it is important to identify 
in advance those observations beyond the explanatory domain that could falsify the theory. 
Observations classified as Type 10 could call into question the theory’s validity and 
potentially falsify it. 
 
Table 2. Cases by Type (n=142) 
  n 
Type 1 46 
Type 2 21 
Type 3 32 
Type 4 2 
Type 5 0 
Type 6 10 
Type 7 5 
Type 8 2 
Type 9 21 
Type 10 3 
Source: Author’s own work 
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Table 2 classifies 142 cases of stadium diplomacy observed since 1958 and reports the 
number in each category. In the following two sections, the utility of each theoretical 
dimension as a determinant will be assessed.  Each section begins with a research design 
which lays out the operationalization criteria for each genotype, followed by the findings.  
 
Durability of Diplomatic Relations 
The dimension consists of four hierarchical categories derived from Rich (2009). An enduring 
friend (Type 1, 2, 3) is operationally defined as a state that has recognized China and the One-
China policy since at least 1976 without interruption;4 a stable friend (Type 4, 5, 6) is a state 
that has recognized China and the One-China policy since at least 1977 without interruption; 
and a new friend (Type 7, 8, 9) is a state that has recognized China and the One-China policy 
since 1990. A non- friend (Type 10) is defined as a state that does not currently recognize 
China or the One-China policy. 
- Findings 
We observe 99 stadiums (70% of all cases) have been directed to enduring friends, 28 
(20%) to new friends, and 12 (8.5%) to stable friends; while 3 cases (2.1%) have been 
directed to non-friends. 
How to differentiate between beneficiaries of stadium diplomacy is of major concern in 
Dunmore’s (2011) attempt to make sense of the phenomenon. By examining patterns of 
stadium diplomacy in the Caribbean, he hypothesizes stadium diplomacy is associated with 
recent changes in diplomatic recognition away from Taiwan. Will (2012) also identifies an 
association between stadium diplomacy and the PRC vs. Taiwan rivalry; however by looking 
at the PRC’s use of stadium diplomacy in other regions, specifically Africa and Central 
America, she arrives at the opposite conclusion as Dunmore and hypothesizes stadium 
diplomacy is directed towards early supporters of the PRC. Our observation that 127 stadium 
diplomacy projects (90% of the total) are directed towards Types 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, and 9 appears to 
support both Dunmore’s and Will’s hypotheses.  
Scholarship into soft power within interstate rivalry is remarkably underdeveloped (for 
one of the few examples, see Mabon, 2013). This is surprising, because the rivalry research 
programme is robust, and states employing soft power to resolve issues-at-stake would be 
 
4 Enduring Friends are early-adopter states which supported China’s initial application or recognized China 
within five years of its successful admission to the UN in 1971.   
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consistent with rivals’ behaviour and a win-at-all-costs mind-set. Rivals will go to 
extraordinary lengths to win, even if it harms themselves (Diehl & Goertz, 2000). They carry 
historical and psychological baggage and have a reason to mistrust the other (Colaresi, Rasler, 
& Thompson, 2007), because their relationship forms through a series of repeated negative 
interactions, each deepening the rivalry spiral (Valeriano, 2012). And for those rivals who 
have been “born-feuding,” these patterns of bellicose behaviour are especially pronounced 
and harder to modify (Wayman, 2000). China’s rivalry with the ROC on Taiwan dates to the 
end of the Chinese Civil War and the 1949 birth of the People’s Republic on the mainland. 
The PRC’s foreign policy has been coloured to a great extent by its continued efforts to 
isolate its rival, the ROC (Ellis, 2012: 11), and it has expended a disproportionate amount of 
effort to pursue this policy goal (Erikson & Chen, 2007: 69). To realist observers, Taiwan 
ought to be an afterthought: recognized by less than two dozen other minor-powers, its 
economy is dwarfed by its mainland rival. But for the PRC, the relationship vis-à-vis Taiwan 
has become loaded with intrinsic, emotional value, making it highly salient (Erikson & Chen, 
2007; Vasquez, 2009).  
It is significant that 14 of the 17 states which recognize Taiwan are in the Caribbean and 
Oceania (Archibold, 2012; Kurlantzick, 2007: 42,142-144). These states, although “miniscule 
and little known [are] vitally important in the diplomatic game between Beijing and 
Taipei;”(Zhu, 2013: 156) and they appear to be serial targets of Chinese soft power, 
suggesting China does indeed use stadium diplomacy as a soft power tool within the context 
of rivalry. Scholarship on China’s international relations grounded in realist logic, e.g. China-
threat theory, cannot account for the China vs. Taiwan rivalry as a salient issue-at-stake for 
decision-makers in Beijing. Critically, realist logic cannot explain the empirical evidence of 
China’s preference for directing stadium diplomacy to enduring and new friends.  
Considering our observations through the lens of interstate rivalry is a novel approach 
that brings theoretical clarity to the uneven geographic distribution of China’s soft power: 
accounting for the intersection of regional salience and rivalry in China’s foreign policy 
(Brautigam, 2009: 125; Erikson & Chen, 2007: 69; Reveron, 2007: 26,31-32). The evidence 
broadly supports the assertion that China uses stadium diplomacy to reward diplomatic 
recognition – and rejection of Taiwan. With 90 percent of cases directed towards enduring 
and new friends, durability of diplomatic recognition appears to offer at least partial 
explanatory power as a determinant of stadium diplomacy. However, 12 cases directed 
towards stable friends had no clear association with the historical development of the China 
vs. Taiwan rivalry. Additionally, three cases were classified as Type 10, falling beyond the 
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explanatory domain of the proposed theory. These three failures of soft power to secure 
diplomatic recognition demonstrate China’s stadium diplomacy is often but not always 
effective. Together, these 15 cases suggest the durability of diplomatic recognition on its own 
lacks explanatory power over the entire phenomenon. 
 
Resource Richness 
To identify cases where resource acquisition may be in play, our typology classifies states into 
three hierarchical categories: resource-rich, potentially resource-rich, and not resource-rich. A 
state is operationally defined as resource-rich if resource export revenues equal at least 20 
percent of total state revenues or exports averaged over five years (International Monetary 
Fund, 2007; International Monetary Fund, 2012: Appendix 1, table 2); or it has proven 
reserves in excess of 10 billion barrels of oil or 3 trillion cubic meters of gas (BP, 2014). A 
state is operationally defined as potentially resource-rich if it has ‘identified reserves but 
production has not yet begun or reached significant levels;’(International Monetary Fund, 
2012: Appendix 1, table 2) or has proven reserves less than 10 billion barrels of oil or 3 
trillion cubic meters of gas (BP, 2014); or if it possesses proven reserves of rare earth 
elements (United Nations Statistics Division, 2015). A state is operationally defined as not 
resource-rich if it fails to meet the criteria for the above two categories.  
The resources used in the operational definitions are previously identified as particularly 
salient to China for its continued economic growth (Ferdinand, 2012: 88), and by extension, 
regime stability (Will, 2011). To protect against over-sensitivity towards small, resource-
driven economies, our classification criteria also consider states with large absolute resource 
reserves to be resource-rich, even if resource exports represent a smaller share of the state’s 
more diversified economy.5 Potentially resource-rich states have reserves of natural resources 
that are neither particularly large nor are they primary economic drivers. Such potentially-rich 
states represent a different type of partner for China which may be behaving as a savvy 
investor or talent scout, identifying untapped sources of future value in order to maximize its 
return on investment. Dichotomizing states as either resource-rich or resource-poor as 
Barranguet (2010) and Ross (2014) do is methodologically questionable, because it assumes 
identical resource richness across the entire domain and cannot account for China’s 
‘moneyball’ behaviour with these types of partner states. 
- Findings 
 
5 e.g. the USA whose natural resource-wealth is large in absolute terms but whose economy is diverse. 
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Our observations reveal that of 142 cases, 53 (37%) have been directed towards resource-rich 
states (Types 1, 4, 7); 23 (16%) towards potentially resource-rich states (Types 2, 5, 8); and 
63 (44%) towards not resource-rich states (Types 3, 6, 9). This bi-modal distribution is 
unexpected given the preponderance of literature support for a resource-seeking Chinese 
foreign policy. 
The pursuit of natural resources is often used to explain China’s international economic 
relations, particularly with developing states (The Economist, 2008a; The Economist, 2008b; 
New African, 2008; Naim, 2009). Such hypotheses rest on the claim that China’s domestic 
political stability is dependent upon maintaining the economic growth that has lifted over 500 
million out of poverty since Deng’s market reforms (Ravallion, 2009; Will, 2011). The raw 
materials to fuel this development, though, increasingly lie beyond China’s borders, 
necessitating that China import its “industrially vital” natural resources (Ferdinand, 2012: 88) 
and pushing China towards new, non-traditional suppliers with higher risks but potentially 
higher rates of return (Brautigam, 2009: 56). Barranguet (2010), Alm (2012), and Ross (2014) 
adopt this ‘stadiums-for-resources’ perspective in their analyses to credibly explain the 
majority of cases within Africa where Graphs 1 and 2 show most cases are located. 
Unfortunately, their distinctions between resource rich and poor states are implicit, lacking 
definitional, and subsequently, analytical clarity.  
The typology allows us to make claims about stadium diplomacy which are supported 
by empirical data. Fifty-four percent of cases are directed towards resource-rich or potentially 
resource-rich states. One interpretation of this finding is the predictions of previous 
investigations are correct about half of the time. On the other hand, those resource-seeking 
predictions fail about half of the time, unable to account for 46 percent of cases, including in 
regions with diplomatic though not economic rationales for Chinese investment (Chen, 2010; 
Sheringham, 2007). This suggests China pursues multiple policy goals through the use of 
stadium diplomacy. Both the resource-richness of China’s partners and the durability of 
diplomatic recognition individually offer partial explanatory power over China’s stadium 
diplomacy; indicating that we are on the correct path when we consider the two determinants 
in tandem to explain China’s use of stadium diplomacy as a soft power foreign policy tool.  
 
Analysis, Discussion, & Conclusions 
Three final tasks remain for our investigation. We must appraise the multi-determinant theory, 
assess stadium diplomacy’s place within China’s foreign policy, and delineate the 
implications of our findings for international relations research programmes. Theory appraisal 
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is crucial for progressive research (Vasquez, 1998: Chapter 10). “Good theory” must describe 
observations of the world with empirical accuracy. If it cannot, it ought to be discarded 
(Vasquez, 1998: 230). We employ a two-tailed Pearson’s chi-square test to determine whether 
the observed distribution of stadiums statistically differs from the predicted distribution. 
Figure 2 displays the crosstab of the nine typological groups within the explanatory domain of 
the multi-determinant theory. Observed values are listed above, with expected values in 
parentheses. Typological groups whose observed value exceeds the expected value are 
bolded.  
 
Figure 2. Chi-Square Analysis of Stadium Diplomacy (valid n=139) 
 
 
Enduring Friends Stable Friends 
New 
Friends 
  
 
 
Resource Rich 
46 2 5 
53  
(37.75) (4.58) (10.66)  
Potentially Resource 
Rich 
21 0 2 
23  
(16.38) (1.99) (4.63)  
Not 
Resource Rich 
32 10 21 
63  
(44.87) (5.44) (12.69)  
 
99 12 28 139  
  
 
 
χ2=24.0133; p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
The analysis finds that a statistically significant difference exists between the observed 
and the predicted distribution of cases across the nine typological groups (χ2=24.0133; 
p<0.001). This allows us to conclude that a relationship between the determinants does exist: 
the multi-determinate theory that China employs stadium diplomacy to secure diplomatic 
recognition in line with the One-China policy and to secure natural resources is empirically 
accurate, and it offers explanatory power. Furthermore, as we will see, it is capable of 
providing new insight into the phenomena and guiding future inquiry. 
Within China’s foreign policy, stadium diplomacy fits a pattern of both hard and soft 
power-projecting behaviours typical of a major-power state. In the past decade, China has 
demonstrated military strength through a new aircraft carrier (Lockie, 2016) and sought to 
build alliances, even joining international efforts to combat piracy (BBC News, 2010). It has 
promoted national values of toughness, resolve, strength, success, and non-interference; and it 
has increasingly demonstrated its economic power and the vitality of its economic system 
Source: Author’s own work  
Author’s own work 
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through foreign aid, scholarships, and investment. Some of China’s power-used-softly might 
seem familiar (cultural exchanges, food, pandas); but China also attracts by appealing not to 
western liberal-democratic values of free speech or political rights but rather to values of 
political non-interference and economic development whose only conditionality is adherence 
to the One-China policy. These atypical attractive values are channelled through atypical 
mediums. Sport is a particularly effective medium, because it is extremely salient. It “is as old 
as we are… When we watch sport we’re more than spectators” (Jennings, 2011: 393), which 
enables it to shape public opinion and transmit values of rivalry, group-identity, competition, 
power, and glory, which are all familiar to international relations scholars. Sport’s multi-
functionality, its ability to simultaneously transmit political and social values makes stadium 
diplomacy an appealing form of power-used-softly. Stadiums and the events they host are 
attractive to recipients, because they are tangible symbols of prestige and status (Rhamey & 
Early, 2013), highly visible markers of a country that is modern and “world-class”’ 
(Bloomfield, 2010: 279).  
The presence of at least 142 stadiums in 61 different countries demonstrates just how 
attractive they are to both recipients and to China. There is a clear, accelerating distributive 
pattern giving quantifiable, empirical support to the proposition that China is deliberate and 
selective in using stadium diplomacy. It projects conspicuous economic capability and 
ambition and can be a powerful attractive tool for achieving China’s core foreign policy 
objectives: recognition vis-à-vis the One-China policy and securing natural resources for 
sustained economic development. China’s international economic engagement takes political 
considerations into account (Dreher & Fuchs, 2011), but this is no different than other major-
powers’ preference for diplomatically aligned partner-states (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, & Thiele, 
2008; Dreher & Fuchs, 2011). Stadium diplomacy is not deviant behaviour by a rogue 
superpower flouting the norms of the international community. It is a new form of attractive 
economic power being used by a superpower to achieve policy goals.  
As an emerging superpower, China has become increasingly willing to play a part in 
affairs beyond its backyard. Its newly prominent place in the international community 
shouldn’t come as a surprise. The only surprise is that a country of China’s size and wealth 
took so long to punch its weight. However, China must be careful to avoid throwing away 
gains it secured through its soft use of power. China’s rise has bred suspicion about its 
motives (Mearsheimer, 2006; Naim, 2009), and its soft power is less attractive if China is 
perceived as threatening (Reveron, 2007; Vuving, 2009: 8-12).  No matter how many roads, 
bridges – or indeed, stadiums – that China builds, if it earns a reputation, deserved or not, as 
Hugh Vondracek  JCIR: Vol. 7, No. 1 (2019) 
77 
 
an aggressive bully operating outside of international norms, China’s ability to leverage its 
attractive power could be severely limited. Such a constraint would be self-inflicted and 
would impede China’s peaceful pursuit of its foreign policy goals. 
 
From this analysis we can conclude that the classification system serves several 
purposes, but its most useful role is the power to demarcate the differences which exist 
between cases. The ten genotypes presented in Figure 1 delineate the two intersecting policy 
goals which underlie China’s use of stadium diplomacy, and they make explicit those cases 
which fall beyond the explanatory domain. The typology provides empirical evidence that 
China’s use of stadium diplomacy is guided by its ongoing rivalry with the ROC on Taiwan 
and its pursuit of natural resources.  
Further, this analysis demonstrates that operationalizing a specific form of soft power, 
the issues-at-stake, and the intended policy outcomes can yield novel and generalizable 
conclusions; and the methodology is capable of guiding the selection of theoretically 
meaningful cases for future empirical research. The utility of this methodological approach 
should be of particular interest to the rivalry and the soft power research programmes. China 
may be unique in employing soft power to gain an advantage over an interstate rival, but that 
seems unlikely knowing what we do about rivals’ mind-sets (Bremer, 1992). Li’s power-used-
softly (2009) offers a framework where illiberal values such as toughness and political non-
interference can be seen to be equally attractive as western-democratic values, which make a 
wider range of political behaviour available for investigation. China’s continued rise as a 
global superpower will see its increasingly frequent and sophisticated use of soft power, and 
social scientists must be equipped to engage with a world in which soft power plays an 
increasingly important role. 
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Appendix 1. Classification of China’s Stadium Diplomacy 
Recipient State 
Completion 
Date 
Stadium Name Location 
Type 1: n=46 
Mongolia 1958 Mongolia Central Sports Palace Ulaanbaatar 
Syria 1980 Tishreen Stadium Damascus 
Mauritania 1983 Stade Olympique Nouakchott 
Suriname 1987 Anthony Nesty Sporthal Paramarbiro 
Papua New Guinea 1991 Sir John Guise Stadium Port Moresby 
Papua New Guinea 1991 National Indoor Sports Complex Port Moresby 
Mali 2002 Stade du 26 Mars Bamako 
Mali 2002 Stade Modibo Keita Bamako 
Mali 2002 Stade Abdoulaye Nakoro Cissoko Kayes 
Mali 2002 Stade Barema Bocoum Mopti 
Mali 2002 Stade Amari Daou Segou 
Mali 2002 Stade Babemba Traore Sissako 
Congo 2007 Municipal Stadium Pointe Noire 
Equatorial Guinea 2007 Estadio de Bata Bata 
Equatorial Guinea 2007 Estadio de Malabo Malabo 
Congo 2008 Denis Sassou-Nguesso Stadium Dolisie 
Angola 2009 Estadio 11 de Novembro Luanda 
Angola 2009 Estadio Nacional de Ombaka Benguela 
Angola 2009 Estadio Nacional do Chiazi Cabinda 
Angola 2009 Estadio Nacional da Tundavala Lubango 
Cameroon 2009 Yaoundé Multipurpose Sports Complex Yaoundé 
Congo 2009 Marien Ngouabi Stadium Owando 
Laos 2009 South-East Asia Games Stadium Vientiane 
Laos 2009 National Aquatics Stadium Vientiane 
Laos 2009 National Tennis Complex Vientiane 
Laos 2009 Gymnasium Tanggo Buntug Vientiane 
Laos 2010 Gymnasium Pahoman Vientiane 
Mongolia 2010 Buyant Ukhaa Sports Complex Ulaanbaatar 
Papua New Guinea 2010 Prince Charles Oval Wewak 
Equatorial Guinea 2011 Estadio de Bata Bata 
Gabon 2011 Stade de l'Amitie Libreville 
Guinea 2011 Nongo Stadium Conakry 
Laos 2011 National Indoor Shooting Center Vientiane 
Zambia 2011 Levy Mwanawasa Stadium Ndola 
Cameroon 2012 Stade de Limbe Limbe 
Zambia 2012 Olympic Youth Development Centre Pool Lusaka 
Zambia 2013 National Heroes Stadium Lusake 
Algeria 2014 Stade Abdelkader Fréha Oran 
Algeria 2015 Grand Stade d'Alger Alger-Baraki 
Cameroon 2015 Bafoussam Omnisport Stadium Bafoussam 
Zambia 2015 Independence Stadium Lusaka 
Cameroon Under Construction Stade OmniSports Yaounde 
Cameroon Under Construction Stade de la Reunification Douala 
Mongolia Under Construction New Mongolia Central Sports Palace Ulaanbaatar 
Gabon Under Construction Stade de Port-Gentil Port-Gentil 
Gabon Under Construction Stade de Oyem Assok Ngomo 
Type 2: n=21 
Tanzania 1969 Uhuru Stadium Dar es Salaam 
Tanzania 1970 Amaan Stadium Zanzibar 
Somalia 1978 Mogadishu Stadium Mogadishu 
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Sierra Leone 1979 National Stadium Freetown 
Uganda 1997 Mandela National Stadium (Namboole) Kampala 
Togo 2000 Kegue Stadium Lome 
Sierra Leone 2002 National Stadium Freetown 
Sierra Leone 2006 Bo Stadium Bo, S. Province 
Ghana 2008 Sekondi Takoradi Stadium Sekondi Takoradi 
Ghana 2008 Tamale Stadium Tamale 
Ghana 2008 Accra Sports Stadium Accra 
Ghana 2008 Baba Yara Stadium Kumasi 
Tanzania 2009 Mkapa National Stadium Dar es Salaam 
Mozambique 2010 Estadio Nacional do Zimpeto Maputo 
Tanzania 2010 Amaan Stadium Zanzibar 
Ghana 2011 Ghana Armed Forces Sport Complex Accra 
Tanzania 2011 Uhuru Stadium Dar es Salaam 
Uganda 2011 Mandela National Stadium (Namboole) Kampala 
Sierra Leone 2014 Bo Municipal Stadium Bo, E. Province 
Ghana 2015 Cape Coast Stadium Cape Coast 
Somalia 2015 Mogadishu Stadium Mogadishu 
Type 3: n=32 
Cambodia 1965 Olympic Stadium Phnom Penh 
Pakistan 1970 Jinnah Stadium Islamabad 
Benin 1982 Stade de l'Amite Cotonou 
Morocco 1983 Moulay Abdallah Stadium Rabat 
Morocco 1983 Salle Omnisports Moulay Abdallah Rabat 
Samoa 1983 Apia Park Stadium Apia 
Rwanda 1986 Amahoro National Stadium Kigali 
Kenya 1987 Moi International Sports Center Nairobi 
Myanmar 1987 Thuwunna Indoor Stadium Yangon 
Mauritius 1991 Stade Anjalay Belle Vue Maurel 
Nepal 1999 Dashrath Stadium Kathmandu 
Seychelles 2002 Piscine Olympique Victoria 
Fiji 2003 National Hockey Centre Suva 
Fiji 2003 Damodar Aquatic Centre Suva 
Fiji 2003 National Netball Centre Suva 
Fiji 2003 Victoria Tennis and Squash Court Suva 
Fiji 2003 Vodafone Arena Suva 
Myanmar 2003 Thuwunna Youth Training Center Stadium (track) Yangon 
Jamaica 2006 Sligoville Mini Stadium Complex Sligoville 
Jamaica 2007 Greenfiled Stadium Trelawny 
Samoa 2007 Samoa National Natatorium Tuanaimato 
Samoa 2007 Apia Park Stadium Apia 
Pakistan 2007 Liaquat Gymnasium Islamabad 
Sri Lanka 2010 Rajapaksa International Cricket Stadium Hambatota 
Seychelles 2011 Piscine Olympique Victoria 
Kenya 2012 Moi International Sports Center Nairobi 
Nepal 2012 Dashrath Stadium Kathmandu 
Cape Verde 2014 Estadio Nacional de Cabe Verde Praia 
Samoa 2015 Apia Park Stadium Apia 
Cambodia Under Construction Cambodia National Stadium Phnom Penh 
Cambodia Under Construction Cambodia National Tennis Complex Phnom Penh 
Cambodia Under Construction Prek Phnov Stadium Phnom Penh 
Type 4: n=2 
Democratic Rep. Congo 1993 Stade de Martys  Kinshasa 
Cote d'Ivoire Under Construction Stade National de la Côte d’Ivoire Abidjan 
86 
86 
 
Type 5: n=0 
        
Type 6: n=10 
Zimbabwe 1987 Zimbabwe National Sports Stadium Harare 
Barbados 1992 Sir Garfield Sobers Gymnasium Wildey 
Djibouti 1993 Stade du Ville Djibouti City 
Micronesia 2002 FSM-China Friendship Sport Center Pohnpei 
Djibouti 2004 Omnisport Cener Dikhil 
Barbados 2005 Sir Garfield Sobers Gymnasium Wildey 
Antigua & Barbuda 2007 Sir Vivian Richards Stadium North Sound 
Zimbabwe 2010 Zimbabwe National Sports Stadium Harare 
Vanuatu Under Construction Korman Stadium Port Vila 
Vanuatu Under Construction Vanuatu Multi-Sport Complex Port Vila 
Type 7: n=5 
Chad 1972 Stade Nacional N'Djaména 
Liberia 1986 Doe Sports Complex Paynesville 
Niger 1989 Stade General Seyni Kountche Niamey 
Niger 1999 Stade General Seyni Kountche Niamey 
Liberia 2007 Doe Sports Complex Paynesville 
Type 8: n=2 
Central African Republic 2006 Barthelemy Boganda Sports Complex Bangui 
Malawi 2015 Civo Stadium Lilongwe 
Type 9: n=21 
Gambia 1984 Gambia Independence Stadium Bakau 
Senegal 1985 Leopold Senghor Stadium Dakar 
Guinea Bissau 1989 Estadio 24 de Setembro Bissau 
Dominica 2007 Windsor Park Roseau 
Grenada 2007 Queen's Park River Road 
Cook Islands 2009 Telecom Sports Arena Avarua 
Senegal 2009 Stade Alassane Djigo Pikine 
Senegal 2009 Stade Ely Manel Fall Diourbel 
Costa Rica 2011 Estadio Nacional de Costa Rica San Juan 
Bahamas 2012 Thomas Robinson Stadium Nassau 
Senegal 2012 Stade Kamine Gueye Kaolack 
Guinea Bissau 2013 Estadio 24 de Setembro Bissau 
Senegal 2013 Caroline Faye Stadium Mbour 
Senegal 2013 Stade Massene Sene Fatick 
Senegal 2013 Stade Al Boury Ndiaye Louga 
Senegal 2013 Stade de Kolda Kolda 
Senegal 2013 Stade de Tamba Tambacounda 
Senegal 2014 Stade Regional de Matam Matam 
Senegal 2014 Stade Mawade Wade de Medina Saint Louis 
Grenada 2015 Kirani James Stadium River Road 
Senegal 2015 Stade Aline Sitoe Diatta Ziguinchor 
Type 10: n=3  
Burkina Faso 1984 Stade du 4 Aout Ouagadougou 
St. Lucia 2002 George Odlum Stadium Vieux Fort 
Kiribati 2007 Betio Sports Complex Tarawa 
         
*(Data collection cut-off: 1 May 2016) 
Source: Author’s own data collection 
 
